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ACQUITTALS IN JEOPARDY: CRIMINAL COLLATERAL
ESTOPPEL AND THE USE OF ACQUITTED ACT EVIDENCE
CYNTHIA L. RANDALLt
INTRODUCTION
A man is tried for attempting to rob a home while using a mask
and gun. In spite of the victim's positive identification, he is
acquitted. Later, he is brought to trial for a bank robbery commit-
ted with a mask and gun. At the second trial, the prosecution
introduces evidence of the first robbery to prove defendant's
identity as the masked man.' Persuaded that the defendant is a
habitual criminal, the jury convicts. The judge, taking evidence of
the earlier robbery into account during sentencing, imposes a
harsher sentence.
2
Was this defendant tried and punished for a crime for which he
had already been acquitted? If so, should the Double Jeopardy
Clause protect him? These questions, long debated in the lower
courts,3 were recently addressed by the Supreme Court in Dowling
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1 This hypothetical closely resembles the facts of Dowling v. United States, 493
U.S. 342 (1990). Although Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence prohibits the
use of evidence of other crimes or acts "to prove the character of a person in order
to show action in conformity therewith," it allows such evidence for "other purposes,
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident." FED. R. EVID. 404(b). In Dowling, the trial court
allowed evidence of a defendant's prior robbery acquittal to prove identity. In the
prior case, the victim testified that the same defendant robbed her house while using
a mask and gun. See Dowling, 493 U.S. at 344. For further discussion of this aspect
of Rule 404(b), see infra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
In this Comment, evidence of another crime or act of a defendant will be
referred to as "other act evidence." If the defendant was acquitted of a crime in the
earlier trial, evidence of involvement in the crime will be called "acquitted act
evidence."
2 Because the standard for admitting evidence of collateral acts in a sentencing
hearing is lower than the reasonable doubt standard required for conviction, evidence
of acquitted acts may be considered in such hearings. See infra notes 101-03 and
accompanying text.
3 See Christopher Bello, Annotation, Admissibility of Evidence as to Other Offense as
Affected by Defendant's Acquittal of That Offense, 25 A.L.R.4th 934, 939 (1983) ("The
various jurisdictions are divided on the approach to be followed in determining the
admissibility of evidence of another crime where the defendant has previously been
acquitted of the other crime.").
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v. United States.4 The Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause
does not bar the use, as other act evidence under Federal Rule of
Evidence 404(b), of an act for which the defendant has previously
been acquitted. 5
The issue presented in Dowling involves a complex interaction
between the Double Jeopardy Clause, collateral estoppel doctrine,
6
and the Federal Rules of Evidence. Longstanding precedent
establishes that the protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause
includes a collateral estoppel component. That is, the Double
Jeopardy Clause prohibits the relitigation of any issue determined
by a valid and final criminal judgment in a prior trial. However,
the doctrine of collateral estoppel, developed in the civil context,
8
requires a clear identification of the issues decided, which is
4 493 U.S. 342 (1990).
5 See id. at 344.
6 Collateral estoppel, a doctrine developed in a civil context, prevents an issue that
has been fully and fairly litigated in one suit from being relitigated in another suit
between the same parties. See infra note 8.
7 See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436,443 (1970) ("Although first developed in civil
litigation, collateral estoppel has been an established rule of federal criminal law at
least since this Court's decision more than 50 years ago in United States v. Oppenheim-
er, 242 U.S. 85 [1916]."). For an extended discussion of Ashe and its progeny, see
infra notes 24-60 and accompanying text.
8 The Restatement ofJudgments defines the doctrine of collateral estoppel in a
civil context as follows:
A valid and final personal judgment is conclusive between the parties,
except on appeal or other direct review, to the following extent:
(3) Ajudgment in favor of either the plaintiff or the defendant is
conclusive, in a subsequent action between them on the same or
a different claim, with respect to any issue actually litigated and
determined if its determination was essential to that judgment.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 17 (1980). This definition requires a finding
that a given issue was necessary to a judgment before it may be given preclusive
effect. Section 28 of the Restatement enumerates exceptions to the collateral
estoppel doctrine:
Although an issue is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final
judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, relitigation
of the issue in a subsequent action between the parties is not precluded in
the following circumstances:
(4) The party against whom preclusion is sought had a significant-
ly heavier burden of persuasion with respect to the issue in the
initial action than in the subsequent action; the burden has shifted
to his adversary; or the adversary has a significantly heavier
burden than he had in the first action.
Id. § 28. This exception requires that an issue to be precluded must have been
proved under the same burden of proof in the first action as would be required in
the second action.
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frustrated in the criminal context by the heavy burden of proof
required for conviction and the overwhelming use of general
verdicts.
9
It is difficult to apply collateral estoppel to criminal verdicts
because a general verdict of acquittal does not specify which
element of the offense was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt
by the prosecution, 10 and the rules of collateral estoppel do not
allow a verdict to have preclusive effect in a subsequent proceeding
where the burden of proof is lighter. I1 These problems are
evident in the Dowling Court's analysis. The Court's holding rests
on two conclusions: 1) the defendant, acquitted by general verdict,
could not meet his burden of showing that the issue he sought to
foreclose was necessary to the acquittal; and 2) collateral estoppel
could not apply because the burden of proof for conviction is
higher than the burden of proof for admitting other act evidence
under Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
12
Although this reasoning follows logically from the civil collateral
estoppel doctrine and from the Court's earlier limitations on the
use of criminal collateral estoppel,13 it nonetheless appears to
thwart the purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause by "effectively
forc[ing] petitioner to defend against charges for which he has
already been acquitted ... . 1 4 In other words, though the specific
holdings of Dowling are consistent with precedent, the Court does
not adequately address an important question arising in this factual
situation: is it fair to compel defendants, on pain of conviction and
enhanced punishment, to defend a charge for which a jury has
already acquitted them?
The Court acknowledges that the use of evidence of acquitted
conduct may be unfair to defendants,15 but it asserts that "non-
constitutional sources like the Federal Rules of Evidence" are
adequate to deal with the "potential for abuse" 16 and suggests
9 See infra notes 72-84 and accompanying text.
10 See infra note 30 for a description of the characteristics of general and special
verdicts.
11 See supra note 8.
12 See Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 348-52 (1990).
I3 See infra notes 72-84 and accompanying text.
14 Dowling, 493 U.S. at 354 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
15 See id. at 352 ("We recognize that the introduction of evidence in circumstances
like those involved here has the potential to prejudice the jury or unfairly force the
defendant to spend time and money relitigating matters considered at the first trial.").
16 Id. at 353 (asserting "that the trial court's authority to exclude potentially
prejudicial evidence adequately addresses th[e] possibility" that ajury will "convict the
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therefore that constitutional protection is not only inappropriate
but unnecessary. This Comment argues that the doctrine of
criminal collateral estoppel, as limited by the Dowling decision, is
inadequate to protect criminal defendants' rights under the Double
Jeopardy Clause and that rules of evidence, as exemplified by the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 17 are inherently ineffective in counter-
acting the unfairness posed by the use of acquitted act evidence.
Because such evidence can be extremely dangerous and prejudicial
to criminal defendants, this Comment will suggest a more effective
means of limiting its use while staying within the constitutional
boundaries established by Dowling.
Part I of this Comment examines the development and purposes
of the criminal collateral estoppel doctrine and its relationship to
the Double Jeopardy Clause. Part II analyzes the Dowling decision
and argues that, in emphasizing an overly formalistic interpretation
of the requirements of collateral estoppel, the Court ignores
substantial doublejeopardy concerns and fails to protect defendants
from unfair prejudice and burdensome relitigation. Part III
analyzes the relationship between the purposes of criminal collateral
estoppel and those of the Federal Rules of Evidence and challenges
the Dowling Court's assumption that the Federal Rules of Evidence
are sufficient to counter the risk of unfairness inherent in the use
of acquitted act evidence. Finally, Part IV formulates a solution-
supplemental special interrogatories for acquitted defendants-that
would more effectively reduce this risk and protect the rights of
defendants under the Double Jeopardy Clause without threatening
defendant on the basis of inferences drawn from the acquitted conduct").
17 The Federal Rules of Evidence obviously apply only in federal court, and thus
the issue of whether state evidence codes can protect defendants from the unfair
prejudice arising from the use of acquitted act evidence presents a related, but
different, question. In making the argument that rules of evidence are insufficient
to combat this prejudice, this Comment uses the Federal Rules of Evidence as an
example, addressing in the notes any relevant variations in the state codes or common
law of evidence. This Comment focuses on the Federal Rules not only because the
Dowling Court specifically suggests that the Federal Rules provide adequate protection
against the dangers discussed herein, but because the Federal Rules have become a
model code of evidence, adopted in whole or in part by many state legislatures, and
representing the law of evidence as it exists in almost half of all U.S. jurisdictions.
See ERic D. GREEN & CHARLES R. NESSON, PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS ON
EVIDENCE xxvi (1983) ("States in growing numbers (22 as of the date this book went
to press) have revised their own rules to conform to the Federal Rules, thus making
the Federal Rules truly a model code.'). In particular, the Federal Rules closely
parallel the law in most other U.S.jurisdictions regarding the admission of other act
evidence. See infra note 114.
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the integrity of the collateral estoppel doctrine or violating the rule
of Dowling.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT AND PURPOSES OF CRIMINAL
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
A. The Double Jeopardy Clause
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides
that no person "shall... be subject for the same offence to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb."18 The animating principle behind
the Double Jeopardy Clause is the prevention of multiple trials.
19
Numerous justifications have been advanced in support of this
principle. 20 First, multiple prosecutions would give the state a
chance to use the first trial as a "dry run" and then perfect its case
before going to trial again, increasing the likelihood that innocent
defendants will be convicted in the subsequent prosecution.
21
Second, barring multiple trials relieves defendants of the anxiety of
anticipating reprosecution and of the time and expense of further
defending against charges for which a jury has already exonerated
them.22 Finally, judicial economy is also served by protecting the
finality of judgments.
23
18 U.S. CONST. amend. V. In Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), the Court
held that the DoubleJeopardy Clause applies to the states through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 794.
19 See United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 345-46 (1975) (stating that
prohibition of multiple trials is the "controlling constitutional principle" of the
Double Jeopardy Clause), rev'd on other grounds, 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
20 See generally Peter Westen & Richard Drubel, Toward a General Theoy of Double
Jeopardy, 1978 SuP. Cr. REV. 81 (discussing finality, double punishment, and
nullification); Twentieth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme
Court and Courts of Appeals 1989-1990, 79 GEo. LJ. 591, 911-55 (1991) (surveying
recent double jeopardy cases).
21 See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 (1978) ("'To permit a second trial
after an acquittal, however mistaken the acquittal may have been, would present an
unacceptably high risk that the Government, with its vastly superior resources, might
wear down the defendant so that 'even though innocent he may be found guilty.'"
(quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957))). This concern is also
expressed in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970). See infra text accompanying note
27.
22 See Green, 355 U.S. at 187 (holding that a defendant should not be forced to
"live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity" about reprosecution).
23 See Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 33 (1978) (stating that a primary purpose of the
Double Jeopardy Clause is "to preserve the finality ofjudgments"); Brown v. Ohio,
432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977) (stating that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects a
"'constitutional policy of finality for the defendant's benefit" (quoting United States
19921
288 UNIVERSITYOFPENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 141:283
B. The Origin of Criminal Collateral Estoppel
It was with these concerns in mind that the Supreme Court in
Ashe v. Swenson,24 extending the protection of the Double Jeopardy
Clause to incorporate the doctrine of collateral estoppel, held that
when an issue of ultimate fact is settled by a valid and final criminal
judgment, it may not be relitigated by the same parties in any future
prosecution.
25
In Ashe, the defendant was one of a group of men accused of
robbing six players at a poker game. The defendant had been
acquitted in a previous trial for robbery of one of the victims,
despite the trial court's instruction that a finding of participation in
the robbery as a whole was sufficient to convict even if the defen-
dant had not personally robbed that victim. Following his acquittal,
the defendant was tried again for the robbery of another one of the
victims and was convicted. In holding the second prosecution to be
a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Court focused on the
fact that, despite the different charges and different evidence
distinguishing the second trial from the first, the issue of whether
the defendant was one of the robbers was the same: "The question
is... simply whether, after ajury determined by its verdict that the
petitioner was not one of the robbers, the State could constitutional-
ly hale him before a new jury to litigate that issue again."26
The clearly stated rationale for the Court's holding in Ashe
reflects traditional justifications for double jeopardy protection,
both in terms of preventing prosecutorial overreaching and of
protecting defendants from the ordeal of multiple trials. Discussing
the improvement of the state's evidence in the second trial, the
Court stated: "'No doubt the prosecutor felt the state had a
provable case on the first charge and, when he lost, he did what
every good attorney would do-he refined his presentation in light
of the turn of events at the first trial.' But this is precisely what the
constitutional guarantee forbids."27 Addressing its incorporation
of the collateral estoppel doctrine into double jeopardy protection,
the Court also stated: "For whatever else that constitutional
v.Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971))).
24 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
25 See id. at 443.
26 Id. at 446.
27 Id. at 447 (quoting Missouri's brief).
ACQUITTALS IN JEOPARDY
guarantee may embrace,... it surely protects a man who has been
acquitted from having to 'run the gauntlet' a second time."
28
C. The Relationship Between the Double Jeopardy Clause
and the Collateral Estoppel Doctrine
Despite its finding that a doctrine of criminal collateral estoppel
is necessary to prevent unfair relitigation, the Ashe Court recognized
that criminal verdicts do not easily lend themselves to the identifica-
tion of issues necessary for collateral estoppel to operate. Courts
applying collateral estoppel must determine exactly which issues
were finally decided by the jury,29 a determination made extremely
difficult by the general verdict delivered in most criminal trials.
30
28 Id. at 445-46 (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 190 (1957)).
2 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
3 A general verdict is "[a] verdict whereby the jury find [sic] either for the
plaintiff or for the defendant in general terms." BLACK's LAw DICTIoNARY 1560 (6th
ed. 1990) (citing Glenn v. Sumner, 132 U.S. 152, 156 (1989)). In criminal cases, a
general verdict of acquittal takes the form of a finding that the defendant is "not
guilty" of the crimes charged. See id. at 1061 (defining not guilty as "the form of the
verdict in criminal cases where the jury acquits the defendant"). The general verdict
is distinguished from the special verdict, which takes the form of findings by the jury
on specific issues of fact, from which findings the judge determines which party
should prevail under the law. See FED. R. CIV. P. 49(a) (providing for special verdicts
in civil cases at the judge's discretion). A third option is to require the jury to return
both a general verdict and "special interrogatories," or questions "upon one or more
issues of fact the decision of which is necessary to a verdict." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra, at 1560. The purpose of the interrogatories is to clarify the bases
for the verdict. Rule 49(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the
use of special interrogatories in civil cases, and provides that the verdict may be
remanded to thejuryif there are inconsistencies between the verdict and the answers
to the interrogatories. See FED. R. CIV, P. 49(b).
Although the use of special verdicts and special interrogatories is common and
accepted in civil cases, the general verdict is still the overwhelmingly predominant
form in criminal trials. One reason for this may be that, while some states have
enacted specific provisions for the use of special verdicts and special interrogatories
in criminal cases, see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1150 (West 1985) and MASS. R. CPIM.
P. 27(c), many have not. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not make any
specific provision for their use and courts have read the omission as significant. As
the First Circuit has noted:
The submission of questions to the jury in civil cases is an everyday
occurrence. In criminal cases, outside of a special, narrow area, the
government is not only without precedent, but faces a formidable array of
objections. The simplest is that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
contain no provision complementing [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 49
covering the civil practice .... While the absence of a rule is not
necessarily determinative, particularly in light of [Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure] 57(b), it is highly suggestive.
1992]
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The prosecution must prove each element of a crime, including the
identity of the perpetrator, the occurrence of the act,31 and the
requisite level of intent,3 2 beyond a reasonable doubt 33 Since
defense attorneys often assert multiple or alternative defenses, it
may not be clear from a general verdict of "not guilty" which
element or elements were not so proved. The Ashe Court exhorted
its successors to approach this problem with "realism and rationali-
ty, 34 and to examine the entire record in order to determine the
issue on which a rational jury would have grounded its verdict.
3 5
Although this determination is necessarily inexact, the Court warned
that any more restrictive test would "amount to a rejection of the
rule of collateral estoppel in criminal proceedings."
3 6
The Court's approach, which represents a compromise between
the strict application of preclusion law and the purposes served by
double jeopardy protection, 37 highlights the tension between these
two legal doctrines underlying the operation of criminal collateral
estoppel. The DoubleJeopardy Clause aims to protect the individu-
al criminal defendant by ensuring that she is not compelled to
relitigate alleged criminal actions after a jury has found her not
guilty. The collateral estoppel doctrine, in contrast, is intended to
promote larger goals of the legal system itself, such as efficiency,
fairness, and truth determination. As one commentator remarked,
United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 180 (1st Cir. 1969). The arguments advanced
in Spock against the use of special interrogatories in criminal cases are further
addressed at infra notes 166-86 and accompanying text, in which this Comment
argues that special interrogatories should be more widely used.
1 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(1) ("A person is not guilty of an offense
unless his liability is based on conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission
to perform an act of which he is physically capable.").
2 See, e.g., id. § 2.02(1) ("A person is not guilty of an offense unless he acted
purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law may require, with respect
to each material element of the offense.").
33 See, e.g., id. § 1.12(1) ("No person may be convicted of an offense unless each
element of such offense is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In the absence of such
proof, the innocence of the defendant is assumed.").
34 Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 444 (1970).
35 See id.
36 Id.
37 See Richard A. Brown, Comment, The Double Jeopardy Clause: Refining the
Constitutional Proscription Against Successive Criminal Prosecutions, 19 UCLA L. REV.
804, 831-32 ("In Ashe, because the jury could have grounded its decision on facts
which would not have negated Ashe's guilt, the Supreme Court apparently took a
broader view of an ultimate issue of fact than would be taken for purposes of civil
collateral estoppel.").
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[D]oublejeopardy is concerned primarily with protecting criminal
defendants from multiple prosecutions. Resjudicata, on the other
hand, is concerned primarily with the effects of judgments on
parties to a dispute. The emphasis is more on the efficient and
fair functioning of the legal system as an institution than on the
relationship to personal rights of the parties s8
To promote the goal of efficiency without sacrificing the goal of
truth determination, the rules of collateral estoppel, as articulated
in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, are designed to ensure
that only those issues that were actually determined by a prior jury
will be given preclusive effect.8 9 This goal conflicts with the aims
of the Double Jeopardy Clause in the criminal context where the
general verdict, designed to protect defendants, also frustrates the
clear identification of issues necessary for the efficient operation of
collateral estoppel. If collateral estoppel were applied strictly in
cases like Ashe, defendants would have no protection from burden-
some relitigation.
Application of collateral estoppel in the criminal context is
similarly frustrated by the heavy burden of proof required in
criminal cases. Prosecutors must prove the defendant's guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.40 Whether a criminal acquittal should collat-
erally estop the state from relitigating the same issue in a subse-
quent civil trial under the more lenient preponderance of the
evidence standard was not clear until the Supreme Court's 1972
case One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States.4 1 In that case the
Court held that an acquittal on smuggling charges did not collateral-
ly estop the government from relitigating the smuggling issue in a
subsequent civil forfeiture action. The Court found that the
difference in the burden of proof in criminal and civil cases
precluded the application of collateral estoppel because the
acquittal "may have only represented 'an adjudication that the proof
was not sufficient to overcome all reasonable doubt of the guilt of
the accused'" and that "as to the issues raised, [the acquittal] does
not constitute an adjudication on the preponderance-of-the-evidence
burden applicable in civil proceedings." 42  Thus, under this
refinement of the Ashe doctrine, an ultimate issue of fact deter-
38 Id. at 805 n.13.
-9 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, supra note 8, § 17.40 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12(1).
41 409 U.S. 232 (1972).
42 Id. at 235 (quoting Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 397 (1938)) (citations
omitted).
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mined by a valid and final criminal judgment can be relitigated
between the same parties if the burden of proof is lighter in the
second suit.
Because the second suit was a civil forfeiture action in which no
criminal penalty was at risk, the Court asserted that double jeopardy
concerns were not implicated.45 Since the constitutional rights of
the defendant were not at issue, the Court saw no reason to depart
from the civil rule of collateral estoppel, 44 which would not protect
the defendant from relitigating this issue. In other words, the
interest of the judicial system in truth determination, which might
be advanced by permitting the smuggling issue to be relitigated
under a lighter standard of proof at the second trial, outweighed
any concerns about subjecting the defendant to multiple prosecu-
tions.
Under the logic of One Lot Emerald Cut Stones, concerns about
the defendant's rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause would be
much stronger if the second suit were criminal rather than civil.
Such a case arose shortly after One Lot Emerald Cut Stones was
decided, and, as might be expected, a contrary result was reached.
In Wingate v. Wainwright,45 the Fifth Circuit held that criminal
collateral estoppel forbids the relitigation of ultimate facts, even
when they are only evidentiary in a second proceeding, if the second
proceeding is a criminal trial.46 In Wingate, the defendant was
43 See id. at 235-36 ("'Congress may impose both a criminal and a civil sanction
in respect to the same act or omission; for the double jeopardy clause prohibits
merely punishing twice, or attempting a second time to punish criminally, for the
same offense.'" (quoting Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938))); see also
United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 366 (1984) (holding
that the DoubleJeopardy Clause has no application where the second proceeding is
not "criminal and punitive" in nature).
It should be noted, however, that with its 1986 amendment of the forfeiture
statute at issue in One Lot Emerald Cut Stones, Congress effectively overruled the case's
specific holding. Congress concluded that, at least in some cases, it would be unfair
to allow the government to proceed with a forfeiture action if the defendant has been
acquitted of the underlying crime at issue. See 18 U.S.C. § 924 (1988) ("Upon
acquittal of the owner or possessor... the seized firearms or ammunition shall be
returned forthwith to the owner or possessor .... .") (emphasis added).
44 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS, supra note 8, § 28.
45 464 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1972).
46 See id. at 213-15. An ultimate fact is one that is essential to the maintenance
of the lawsuit, including the statutory elements of the crime. Evidentiary facts are
"[t]hose facts which are necessary for determination of the ultimate facts; theyare the
premises upon which conclusions of ultimate facts are based." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 557 (6th ed. 1990) (citing Womack v. Industrial Comm'n, 451 P.2d 761,
764 (Colo. 1969), as originating the definition). For example, in a rape case, the issue
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tried for allegedly robbing a store. To prove the defendant's
identity as the robber, the government introduced modus operandi
evidence4 7 in the form of testimony from two other store owners
suggesting that Wingate had robbed their stores in the past. This
testimony was introduced despite Wingate's prior acquittal of each
of these offenses.
This factual situation is analogous to that in One Lot Emerald Cut
Stones in that the standard of proof necessary for the admission of
other act evidence is lighter than the standard of proof needed for
criminal conviction.4" Thus, under the rule of One Lot Emerald Cut
Stones, the acquittal would not preclude the government from
reusing this evidence. Unlike the Court in One Lot Emerald Cut
Stones, however, the Wingate court found that the Double Jeopardy
Clause clearly applied because the second trial was a criminal trial
and the defendant thus bore the same burden (complete litigation
of the issue) and faced the same risk (conviction and criminal
ofwhether the victim consented is an issue of ultimate fact because its resolution will
determine the outcome of the prosecution. The issue of whether the victim had
sexual relations with the defendant in the past is an evidentiary fact because the
resolution of this question will only make it more or less likely that she consented on
the occasion in question. For further explication of this distinction, see Miguel M.
Delao, Comment, Admissibility of Prior Acquitted Crimes Under Rule 404(b): Why the
Majority Should Adopt the Minority Rule, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1033, 1036 n.20 (1989)
("Ultimate facts are those facts which must be proved to convict the defendant; they
are the 'sine qua non' of the charge. [They] include, but are not limited to, the
statutory elements of the crime.") (citation omitted); Paul Harper, Note, Evidentiaty
Use of Prior Acquittals: When Analysis Exceeds Reality, 24 AKRON L. REv. 199, 200 &
n.13 (1990).
4 7 See infra notes 83 and 109 and accompanying text for a definition of modus
operandi evidence.
48 The standard under which a party must prove that an act occurred before it
may be introduced as other act evidence has always been lighter than the standard of
proof necessary for criminal conviction. Recently, the Supreme Court decided in
Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988), that other act evidence is
admissible if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude by a
preponderance of the evidence that the other act occurred. See id. at 689-90. Prior
to this decision, however, a variety of admissibility standards were used. Somejuris-
dictions, for example, prohibited the introduction of other act evidence unless the
trial court first found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant had
committed the other act. See e.g., United States v. Leonard, 524 F.2d 1076, 1090-91
(2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 958 (1976). Other jurisdictions only allowed
introduction of such evidence if the state proved to the court by "clear and
convincing evidence" that the defendant had committed the other act. See, e.g.,
United States v. Leight, 818 F.2d 1297, 1302 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 958
(1987). Nojurisdiction, however, required such a finding beyond a reasonable doubt.
See Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 685 n.2 (summarizing the standards in effect in various
circuits).
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punishment) as he had in the first trial. In holding that the Double
Jeopardy Clause prohibited this evidentiary use of acquitted
conduct, the Fifth Circuit stated that it did not "perceive any
meaningful difference in the quality of 'jeopardy' to which a
defendant is again subjected"49 when a settled issue is relitigated
as an evidentiary fact:
In both instances the state is attempting to prove the defendant
guilty of an offense other than the one of which he was acquitted.
In both instances the relitigated proof is offered to prove some
element of the second offense. In both instances the defendant is
forced to defend again against charges or factual allegations which
he overcame in the earlier trial."0
Thus, when the subsequent trial is a criminal trial, the concerns of
the Double Jeopardy Clause outweigh the purposes served by a
hypertechnical application of the collateral estoppel doctrine.
Seven years after Wingate, the Second Circuit adopted the Fifth
Circuit's analysis in United States v. Mespoulede.-5 In holding that
Mespoulede's acquittal on cocaine possession charges precluded the
government from relitigating the issue of possession in a subsequent
conspiracy trial, the court emphasized that the second trial's
criminal context implicated the Double Jeopardy Clause whereas a
civil trial would not. Rather than facing "sanctions or penalties of
quite a different order than those he escaped through acquittal on
criminal charges," the defendant runs the risk of incurring "criminal
sanctions that, realistically, may be imposed in large part because
the second jury is persuaded that he possessed cocaine .... "
5 2
Similarly, in United States v. Keller,53 the Third Circuit held that
evidence of acquitted drug crimes could not be used to impeach the
defendant in a subsequent drug conspiracy trial. Again, in reaching
this conclusion, the court emphasized that the unjust burden on
defendants of having to relitigate previously decided issues is not
substantially affected by the status of that issue as necessary or
unnecessary to the second charge. Referring to the language in
Ashe urging "realism and rationality" when applying the criminal
collateral estoppel doctrine, the Third Circuit concluded that not
only could criminal collateral estoppel be applied to established
49 Wingate, 464 F.2d at 213.
5o Id. at 213-14.
51 597 F.2d 329, 334-35 (2d Cir. 1979).
52 Id. at 335.
53 624 F.2d 1154 (3d Cir. 1980).
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facts not necessary to sustain the conviction sought at retrial, but
that Ashe "could be interpreted ... to bar any use in subsequent
prosecutions of evidence previously determined in defendant's favor
by a prior... acquittal."' 4 Following this view, the Third Circuit
held in Dowling v. United States,55 that even when the burden of
proof required for admission of the evidence in the second trial is
manifestly and significantly lighter 6 than the reasonable doubt
standard required for conviction in the first trial, it is still inappro-
priate to allow a second jury to conclude that the defendant
committed an act for which another jury had acquitted her.
57
At the time the Supreme Court decided Dowling v. United
States,58 a majority of the federal circuit courts, adopting the
reasoning of Wingate, barred any reuse of evidence in subsequent
criminal trials of acts for which a defendant had previously been
acquitted.59 A significant minority of state courts had also adopt-
ed this position.6" In Dowling, the Supreme Court resolved the
54 Id. at 1158-60 & nn. 4-5.
55 855 F.2d 114 (3d Cir. 1988), affid, 493 U.S. 342 (1990).
5 The burden of proof required for admission of other act evidence under Rule
404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence is now very light: the judge need not find
by a preponderance of the evidence that the act occurred, but need only find that a
reasonable jury could conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that they
occurred. See supra note 48.57 See Dowling, 855 F.2d at 122.
58 493 U.S. 342 (1990). For a discussion of the holding of Dowling, see infra notes
62-84 and accompanying text.
59 Specifically, the District of Columbia, First, Second, Third, Seventh, and
Eleventh Circuits adopted this position and held that an issue of ultimate fact, which
has been resolved in the defendant's favor by a valid and final judgment in a prior
criminal case, cannot be litigated again between the same parties. See United States
v. Day, 591 F.2d 861, 869 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1978); United States v. Gonzalez-Sanchez,
825 F.2d 572, 583-84 (1st Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Latorre v. United States, 484 U.S.
989 (1987); United States v. Mespoulede, 597 F.2d 329,335-36 (2d Cir. 1979); United
States v. Keller, 624 F.2d 1154, 1160 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v. Castro, 629 F.2d
456, 464-65 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. Hogue, 812 F.2d 1568, 1578 (11th Cir.
1987); Albert v. Montgomery, 732 F.2d 865, 869 (11th Cir. 1984).
On the other hand, the Fourth, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits had adopted
the opposingview, i.e., that collateral estoppel does not preclude the use of acquitted
act evidence as other act evidence in a subsequent trial. See United States v. Bice-Bey,
701 F.2d 1086, 1089 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 837 (1983); United States v. Riley,
684 F.2d 542, 546 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1111 (1983); United States v.
Castro-Castro, 464 F.2d 336, 337 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 916 (1973);
United States v. Van Cleave, 599 F.2d 954, 957 (10th Cir. 1979). See generally Delao,
supra note 46, at 1037-38 & nn. 24-43 (analyzing the positions of various circuits).
" The position of the Wingate court had been adopted in Arizona, Florida,
Georgia, Illinois, Minnesota, Nevada, New York, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia. See
e.g., State v. Little, 350 P.2d 756 (Ariz. 1960); State v. Perkins, 349 So. 2d 161 (Fla.
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circuit split by implicitly rejecting the reasoning of Wingate and
applying the rule of One Lot Emerald Cut Stones in the context of a
criminal trial,6 1 thus foreclosing the argument that double jeopar-
dy concerns should make the doctrine of collateral estoppel operate
differently in the criminal, as opposed to the civil, context.
II. THE SUPREME COURT SPEAKS: DOWLING V. UNITED STATES
In Dowling, the defendant was convicted of robbing a bank while
wearing a ski mask and carrying a gun. 62 At trial, the government
introduced, under Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the
testimony of Mrs. Vena Henry, who stated that some time after the
bank robbery the defendant had attempted to rob her house using
a mask and gun.63 The trial court allowed this evidence even
though Dowling had already been tried and acquitted for the
attempted robbery of Mrs. Henry.64 The government had two
purposes in introducing Mrs. Henry's testimony: first, it wanted to
strengthen its identification of Dowling as the bank robber,65 and
second, it wanted further to link Dowling with Delroy Christian,
who was positively identified at the scene of both crimes. 66 The
trial judge instructed the jury that Dowling had been acquitted of
the attempted robbery and that the jury should only consider Mrs.
Henry's testimony for the limited purpose for which it was intro-
duced.6 7 On appeal, the Third Circuit held that the acquittal
1977); Moore v. State, 333 S.E. 2d 605 (Ga. 1985); People v. Grayson, 319 N.E. 2d 43
(Ill. 1974); State v. Burton, 281 N.W. 2d 195 (Minn. 1979); McMichael v. State, 638
P.2d 402 (Nev. 1982); People v. Acevedo, 508 N.E. 2d 665 (N.Y. 1987); State v.
Holman, 611 S.W. 2d 411 (Tenn. 1981); Dedrick v. State, 623 S.W. 2d 332 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1981); Simon v. Commonwealth, 258 S.E. 2d 567 (Va. 1979).
61 See Dowling, 493 U.S. at 349 ("Our decision is consistent with other cases where
we have held that an acquittal in a criminal case does not preclude the Government
from relitigating an issue.., in a subsequent action governed by a lower standard of
proof.").
62 See Dowling, 493 U.S. at 344.
61 See id. at 344-45.
64 See id. at 345.
65 Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) prohibits the use of evidence of other "crimes,
wrongs, or acts" to show bad character, but allows such evidence for other purposes,
such as to show identity or intent. FED. R. EVID. 404(b); see also infra notes 114-22
and accompanying text.
6 See Dowling, 493 U.S. at 345.
67 See id. at 346.
ACQUITTALS IN JEOPARDY
collaterally estopped the government from introducing Mrs. Henry's
evidence. 68  The court affirmed Dowling's conviction, however,
because the other evidence against him was "overwhelming" and
hence the introduction of Mrs. Henry's testimony was harmless er-
ror.
69
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the
collateral estoppel component of the Double Jeopardy Clause
should have precluded the admission of Mrs. Henry's testimony. It
held that collateral estoppel did not apply in these circumstances,
both because the standard of proof was lighter in the second trial
than in the first and because the defendant could not prove that the
issue he sought to preclude was essential to the first judgment.7
°
A. Relative Standards of Proof
In Dowling, the Court asserted that the standard of proof
required for a verdict in the defendant's prior criminal trial was
much higher than that required to introduce the same evidence in
a second criminal trial. 71 After the Court's decision in Huddleston
v. United States,72 a trial judge may allow evidence of other acts to
be admitted if she finds that a reasonable jury could find by a
preponderance of the evidence that the alleged acts occurred. 7
The standards of proof being unequal, the Court, citing One Lot
Emerald Cut Stones, held that the prior acquittal could not preclude
a second jury's consideration of the issue under the lighter standard
for admission of the acquitted act evidence. 74 In other words, an
acquittal only establishes that reasonable doubt exists as to the
defendant's guilt and does not function as a determination of
innocence. Under this reasoning, a second jury's conclusion that
the defendant was more likely than not to have committed the first
robbery is not inconsistent with the firstjury's finding of reasonable
doubt.
The Court's analysis, although logically consistent, applies civil
doctrine in a criminal context without considering how the criminal
68 See United States v. Dowling, 855 F.2d 114, 120-22 (3d Cir. 1988), afd, 493 U.S.
342 (1990). Alternatively, the court held that the evidence should have been excluded
under Rules 404(b) and 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See id. at 122.
69 See id. at 122-24.
70 See Dowling, 493 U.S. at 348-50.
71 See id. at 348-49.
72 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
73 See id. at 681; see also supra note 48 for a discussion of Huddleston.
74 See Dowling, 493 U.S. at 349-50.
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context alters the significance of the double jeopardy interests at
stake. The Court in One Lot Emerald Cut Stones was careful to point
out that its holding had no double jeopardy implications since the
second trial was civil and the government has the right to impose
both civil and criminal sanctions for the same offense.75 In
Dowling, as in Wingate and its progeny, the second trial was criminal
and involved a criminal penalty as great or greater than the one
avoided by the acquittal. As Justice Brennan pointed out in his
dissent in Dowling, when the state seeks to punish a defendant, "the
concern for fairness is much more acute."76 In this case, as in
Wingate, the evidentiary purpose for which the issue was introduced
in the second trial did not change the fact that the defendant had
to "mount a second defense" to a crime for which he had been
acquitted, or that such relitigation increased the risk that the jury
would wrongly find him guilty of that offense, particularly since the
second jury only had to make this finding by a preponderance of
the evidence.77 This finding, in turn, bore significantly on defend-
ant's guilt in the second trial. Thus, in insisting on a strict
application of the civil collateral estoppel doctrine, the Court
ignored substantial double jeopardy concerns.
B. Determination of Issues Essential to the Judgment
The Dowling Court also held that collateral estoppel did not
prevent the introduction of the acquitted act evidence because the
general verdict of not guilty in the first trial failed to establish
conclusively that Dowling was not the perpetrator of the alleged
robbery. 78 The Court reasoned that the verdict could have been
based on a finding that Dowling was the man who entered Mrs.
Henry's house, but that the prosecution failed to prove the elements
of the crimes charged. Since it could not be shown that the
acquittal was based on Dowling's identity, it should not preclude
75 See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
76 Dowling, 493 U.S. at 361 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
7 See id. at 362.
78 The Court made this determination based on a reported conversation between
the prosecutor, Dowling's attorney, and the district judge in which the prosecutor
contended that Dowling had "not disputed identity" in the first trial, but had merely
denied that a robbery had taken place. See id. at 351. The Court took notice of the
fact that the districtjudge believed'that Dowling's presence in the house had not been
"seriously contested," even though Dowling had stated a general defense and did not
testify. See id.
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Mrs. Henry's testimony that Dowling was the man who entered her
house with a mask and gun.
This holding, although technically accurate, fails to employ the
"realism and rationality" urged by the Court in Ashe v. Swenson 79
when applying criminal collateral estoppel.80 First, as Justice
Brennan noted in his dissent, there was sufficient evidence to
suggest strongly that Dowling's first jury did acquit on the basis of
identity.81 Second, and more importantly, whatever the basis of
the jury's acquittal, it does indicate a finding that the defendant did
not commit attempted robbery.8 2 Even if the jury's acquittal was
based on a lack of intent rather than identity, the verdict would
then mean that, although Dowling may have been present at Mrs.
Henry's house, he did not attempt a robbery.
The status of this event as a crime, however, and particularly as
attempted robbery, is what makes it relevant as other act evidence
in the second trial-it is being introduced to show Dowling's identity
as a robber. s  If no attempted robbery occurred, the event is
irrelevant in Dowling's second trial for bank robbery. Mrs. Henry's
testimony would only be relevant if she characterized the event in
her house as an attempted robbery, and it is clear from the record
that she did so.84 Given this fact, the Supreme Court's reasoning
79 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
1o See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of Ashe.
81 See Dowling, 493 U.S. at 358 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Because Dowling was
charged with numerous offenses relating to the incident at Mrs. Henry's house,
Justice Brennan reasoned that if Dowling had been acquitted of attempted robbery
because he lacked the requisite intent he would still have been found guilty of a
weapons offense. The jury did not make such a finding, however, leading to the
rational conclusion that the "jury rested its verdict on the belief that the petitioner
was not present in the Henry home." Id.
82 The verdict further indicates a finding that Dowling committed no crime ofany
kind in Mrs. Henry's home since he was acquitted of all charges. See id.
83 When used to prove identity, evidence of another crime normally must reveal
a similar modus operandi, such that it is highly likely that the same person committed
both crimes. See EDWARD W. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 190, at 559 (3d
ed. 1984) [hereinafter MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE] (stating that other crimes evidence
may be used "to prove other crimes by the accused so nearly identical in method as
to earmark them as the handiwork of the accused"). Unless the event at Mrs. Henry's
house was a robbery, there is no connection between that event and the bank robbery
sufficient to suggest a modus operandi.
84 See Dowling, 493 U.S. at 344-45; United States v. Dowling, 855 F.2d 114, 120 (3d
Cir. 1988) ("Vena Henry... described how a man wearing a knitted mask with cut
out eyes.., and carrying a small handgun.., broke into her home.., and how, in
a struggle, she pulled the mask off the intruder, whom she identified as Dowling.
Dowling was thereafter charged.., with burglary, [and] attempted robbery...."),
aff'd, 493 U.S. 342 (1990).
1992]
300 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 141:283
in holding that the acquittal did not preclude Mrs. Henry's
testimony was essentially that, even though there was no possible
basis for the acquittal consistent with the jury's believing all of Mrs.
Henry's testimony, none of it was precluded because it was
impossible to determine which part the jury did not believe. This
technical approach to collateral estoppel realizes the fear expressed
in Ashe that a strict application of the doctrine would make it
ineffectual in a criminal context.
III. THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE DOWLING DOCTRINE To PROTECT
ACQUITED DEFENDANTS FROM UNFAIR PREJUDICE
The clear implication of Dowling is that criminal collateral
estoppel will bar relitigation only in those cases in which the issue
to be precluded is an "ultimate fact" in the second trial as well as
the first, which essentially means that both trials arise out of the
same criminal transaction and that the disputed issue is essential to
prove both crimes. 85 In addition, for a criminal defendant to
assert successfully a collateral estoppel defense, she will bear the
burden of demonstrating that the issue to be precluded was in fact
the basis of the first jury's general verdict of acquittal. In practice,
this means that collateral estoppel offers very little protection to the
acquitted defendant 6 because the basis for an acquittal will only
" The Dowling Court asserted:
[In Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970),] the acquittal verdict could only
have meant that thejury was unable to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant was one of the bandits. A second prosecution was
impermissible because, to have convicted the defendant in the second trial,
the second jury had to have reached a directly contrary conclusion.
Dowling contends that, by the same principle, his prior acquittal
precluded the Government from introducing into evidence Henry's
testimony... in the bank robbery case. We disagree because, unlike the
situation in Ashe v. Swenson, the prior acquittal did not determine an
ultimate issue in the present case.
Dowling, 493 U.S. at 348 (citation omitted).
86 Unfortunately, the impotence of the collateral estoppel doctrine is not
restricted to the introduction of an acquitted act as acquitted act evidence. For
example, the government has used evidence of acquitted acts as proof of overt acts
to support a conspiracy charge. See United States v. Irvin, 787 F.2d 1506, 1515-16
(11th Cir. 1986) (holding that the doctrine of collateral estoppel did not bar the
United States from introducing evidence of assaults committed against an employee
as overt acts in furtherance of a conspiracy to violate the civil rights of his employer,
even though defendant had been acquitted of these assaults). The government has
also introduced evidence of acquitted acts to support a charge of aiding and abetting.
See United States v. Nelson, 599 F.2d 714, 716-17 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that
acquittal on drug conspiracy charges did not collaterally estop the government from
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be clear when only one defense was presented. Placing the burden
of demonstrating the basis of an acquittal on defendants ensures
that the vast majority of acquittals will have no preclusive effect.
In addition, by resting its holding on a strict application of civil
collateral estoppel, the Court ignored the underlying double
jeopardy issue of whether the real burdens and risks imposed on
defendants who must defend acquitted conduct as an evidentiary
fact are significantly different than those imposed when the conduct
constitutes an ultimate fact. Realistically, these burdens are very
similar: evidence that defendant committed other crimes is
extremely prejudicial and must be defended to the same extent as
the presently charged crime. Furthermore, as will be shown, the
Federal Rules of Evidence, which the Dowling Court believed would
sufficiently protect the defendant from unfairness, 87 are inherently
inadequate to overcome the danger of unfair prejudice resulting
from the introduction of acquitted act evidence.
A. The Danger to Defendants of Introducing Other Act Evidence
Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence prohibits the use
of evidence of other "crimes, wrongs, or acts" to show that the
defendant acted in conformity with past behavior.s8  Such evi-
dence is excluded because of its tendency to be unfairly prejudicial
prosecuting the defendant as an aider and abettor of the same underlying offenses,
so long as the government did not rely on evidence tending to show a conspiracy).
Finally, prosecutors have also used acquitted act evidence as the basis for tax
prosecutions. See United States v. Crispino, 586 F. Supp. 1525,1529-32 (D.N.J. 1984)
(holding that acquittal on narcotics charges did not collaterally estop the government
from advancing a theory of narcotics trafficking as the basis for its case that
defendant received large amounts of unreported income). For an overview of the
areas where defendants may be forced to redefend acquittal verdicts if collateral
estoppel is strictly applied, see Anne B. Poulin, Collateral Estoppel in Criminal Cases:
Reuse of Evidence After Acquittal, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1989).
87 See Dowling, 493 U.S. at 352; see also supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
8 Rule 404 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides in pertinent part:
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait
of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in
conformity therewith on a particular occasion ...
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts
is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action
in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes,
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident ....
FED. R. EVID. 404(a)-(b). Each state also has a similar rule, although the wording
differs, particularly as to the permitted uses of other act evidence. See infra note 114.
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to defendants. As the Advisory Committee explains, bad character
evidence permits the jury to "'punish the bad man because of [his]
character[] despite what the evidence in the case shows actually hap-
pened. ' "89 Commentators have identified at least three other
reasons why other act evidence prejudices defendants. First, juries
tend to regard defendants who have committed prior crimes as
more likely to have committed the crime at issue, believing that past
criminality shows a propensity towards criminal behavior.9
0
Second, evidence of prior crimes may cause the jury to regard the
defendant as a habitual criminal and to care less whether she is
actually guilty or innocent of the current crime alleged.91 For this
reason, ajury might decide a close case in favor of conviction rather
than acquittal because the perceived moral consequences of a wrong
verdict are much lighter.9 2 Finally, juries are less likely to believe
the testimony of a defendant who they think has committed other
crimes because of the general societal belief that criminals are
dishonest.93 Even if the defendant does not testify, the credibility
of any version of events put forward by the defense is lessened if
she is perceived as dishonest. For all these reasons, it is almost
impossible for juries not to misuse and overestimate the value of
evidence that the defendant committed other crimes. 94 As Profes-
89 FED. R. EVID. 404(a) advisory committee's note (quoting CALIFORNIA LAW
REVISION COMM'N, TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATION AND A STUDY RELATING TO THE
UNIFORM RuLEs OF EVIDENCE 615 (1964)).
90 See 1AJOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 192, at 1857
(1983) (noting that "the impulse to argue from [a defendant's] former bad deed...
directly to his doing... the bad deed charged is perhaps a natural one"); 22 CHARLES
A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM,JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5239,
at 436 (1978) (suggesting that since the natural tendency of the human mind is to
generalize, the introduction of other crimes evidence could lead to a bias against the
accused); Richard B. Kuhns, The Propensity to Misunderstand the Character of Speclfic
Acts Evidence, 66 IOWA L. REv. 777, 777-78 (1981) (noting that upon learning about
a defendant's past criminal behavior, a factfinder might be more willing to convict
despite any reasonable doubt as to her guilt).V1 See RICHARD 0. LEMPERT & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO
EVIDENCE 164-65 (2d ed. 1982) (noting that "knowledge that an individual has been
guilty of past crimes may change the regret which the fact finder associates with
mistakenly finding that that person is guilty"); Calvin W. Sharpe, Two-Step Balancing
and the Admissibility of Other Crimes Evidence: A Sliding Scale of Proof, 59 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 556, 566 (1984) (noting that other crimes evidence may make the jury "less
concerned about reaching a wrong verdict").
92 Professor Sharpe refers to this phenomenon as altering the jury's "regret
matrix." See Sharpe, supra note 91, at 566.9
3 See Comment, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial: OfBalancingand Other Matters, 70
YALE L.J. 763, 764 (1961) (stating that other crimes evidence may lead "jurors
generally to distrust all the evidence offered by the accused").
" See United States v. Shelton, 628 F.2d 54, 56 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("We have
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sor Wigmore stated, "[t]he natural and inevitable tendency of the
tribunal-whether judge or jury-is to give excessive weight to the
vicious record of crime ... ."95 As one court asserted, once other
act evidence has been admitted, the presumption of the defendant's
innocence-the right of all defendants, past criminal or not-will be
severely tainted. 6
When the other act in question was subject to acquittal in the
first trial, the prejudice resulting from jury overestimation in the
second proceeding is further intensified. First, the jury might be
outraged that the defendant escaped punishment for her earlier
crime and was allowed "back on the street" to commit further
criminal acts.9 7 Second, acquittal significantly lessens the proba-
tive worth of the evidence because it is much less likely that the act
occurred in the first place. An acquittal represents, at the very
least, a determination that a reasonable doubt exists as to the
occurrence of the other act, but it may also represent an affirmative
belief on the part of the jury that the defendant was entirely
innocent. Where the occurrence of an other act is in doubt, the
chances greatly increase that truly innocent defendants will be
deprived of a much-needed presumption that they are law abiding
citizens, and that juries will make prejudicial determinations based
not only on an inaccurate understanding of criminal propensity,98
but on inaccurate facts. For this reason, the argument is frequently
made that the probative value of acquitted act evidence is almost
always outweighed by the unfair prejudice likely to result from its
introduction.
99
recognized before thatjuries are prone to draw illogical and incorrect inferences from
[other act] evidence."); Delao, supra note 46, at 1046 (stating that "juries give prior
convictions immense weight, and the prejudice engendered by revelations of past
criminal conduct is nearly insurmountable"); Sharpe, supra note 91, at 562 n.27
("Whatever the true probability that commission of a crime will be followed by other
criminal acts, it is highly unlikely that the aggregate intuitions of ajury will produce
an accurate assessment of the worth of such evidence.").
95 WIGMORE, supra note 90, § 58.2, at 1212.
96 See United States v. Daniels, 770 F.2d 1111, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("[O]nce
evidence of prior crimes reaches the jury, 'it is most difficult, if not impossible, to
assume continued integrity of the presumption of innocence. A drop of ink cannot
be removed from a glass of milk.'" (quoting Virgin Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278,283
(3d Cir. 1976))).97 See LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 91, at 218 (noting the danger that ajury
may vote to convict only because they believe the defendant deserves to be punished
for a series of immoral actions).
9 See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
9 See United States v. Dolliole, 597 F.2d 102, 107 (7th Cir. 1979) ('Unless the
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With this degree of prejudice at risk, defendants have no choice
but vigorously to defend themselves against other act evidence.
Despite its status as evidentiary rather than ultimately factual, such
evidence can be the basis of a conviction in the second trial. 10°
Furthermore, because the standard for admitting "collateral act"
evidence in sentencing hearings may be lower than the reasonable
doubt standard, 10 1 the Dowling analysis would permit a judge to
consider other act evidence when sentencing the defendant for the
subsequent crime and maybe enhance the defendant's punishment
accordingly.10 2 The judge, like the jury at trial, may make her
own determination of the defendant's guilt under a preponderance
standard. The consequences of allowing acquitted acts to be
considered in sentencing are quite severe, as the punishment for a
given crime may be substantially increased if there are aggravating
circumstances or if the defendant is a repeat offender.10 3 Thus,
prior crime evidence is clear and convincing its probative value simply cannot justify
its potential for prejudice."); Delao, supra note 46, at 1046-49 (suggesting that the
"relevance of an extrinsic offense is often fatally undermined by an acquittal");Judith
M.G. Patterson, Evidence of Prior Bad Acts: Admissibility Under the Federal Rules, 38
BAYLOR L. REV. 331,354-55 (1986) (noting that without clear and convincing proof
of the other crimes evidence, its probative value is always substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice); Sharpe, supra note 91, at 567 (suggesting that courts
must demand great certainty that the other crime occurred when the danger of unfair
prejudice is high).
1oo See e.g., United States v. Mespoulede, 597 F.2d 329,335 (2d Cir. 1979) (stating
that, "realistically", thejury in the second trial convicted "in large part" because it was
persuaded that the defendant committed an act for which he was acquitted but which
was introduced as other act evidence).
101 Collateral act evidence is evidence of other crimes which can function as
aggravating circumstances under a sentencing scheme, resulting in a harsher sentence.
See infra note 103. In McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986), the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of a sentencing that required proof of a collateral
act by a preponderance of the evidence.
102Justice Brennan identified this concern in his dissent in Dowling v. United
States, 493 U.S. 342, 363 (1990), and his fears appear to have been realized. Several
circuits have interpreted Dowling to allow the use of acquitted act evidence in
sentencing. See e.g., United States v. Averi, 922 F.2d 765, 766 (11th Cir. 1991)
("Acquitted conduct may be considered by a sentencing court because a verdict of
acquittal demonstrates a lack of proof sufficient to meet a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
standard-a standard of proof higher than that required for consideration of relevant
conduct at sentencing."); United States v. Former, 920 F.2d 1330,1333 (7th Cir. 1990)
("It follows [from the difference in the standard of proof] that judges may consider
prior misconduct despite the defendant's acquittal on charges arising out of that
misconduct."). Furthermore, the Supreme Court recently considered a case in which
acquitted act evidence was used by the judge to change the defendant's sentence from
life imprisonment to the death penalty. See Florida v. Burr, 496 U.S. 914, 915 (1990).
In remanding the case for reconsideration in light of Dowling, the Court suggests that
this use of collateral act evidence is permissible. See id. at 914.
13 See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
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a defendant may not only be convicted on the basis of crimes for
which she has already been acquitted, but she may be punished for
them as well. These are precisely the kind of dangers against which
the double jeopardy clause is intended to protect defendants,
104
and the Dowling Court's failure to recognize them leaves defendants
extremely vulnerable to unfair prejudice and the burdens of
repeated litigation.
B. The Limitations of the Federal Rules of Evidence
The Dowling Court did acknowledge that the use of an acquitted
act as other crime evidence could "prejudice the jury or unfairly
force the defendant to spend time and money relitigating matters
considered at the first trial."1" 5 It suggested, however, that the
"potential for abuse" could be decreased through "non-constitution-
al [prophylactics] like the Federal Rules of Evidence." 1°6 The
Court's faith is misplaced, however: neither the Federal Rules of
Evidence nor any state code of evidence 10 7 is clearly adequate to
address the potential for unfairness resulting from the intioduction
of acquitted act evidence.
The most significant and obvious shortcoming of the Rules of
Evidence is that they are primarily concerned with the effect of a
given piece of evidence in the present trial, and therefore, do not
weigh the detrimental consequences of forcing defendants to
relitigate the same facts or issues in trial after trial. Rule 403 is the
rule which governs the exclusion of relevant evidence on the
grounds of prejudice."' Rule 403 provides that evidence may be
§§ 3A1, 4A1 (1991) (enhanced sentencing guidelines for criminal history and
aggravating circumstances).
104 See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
105 Dowling, 493 U.S. at 352.
106 Id.
107 See supra note 17.
10 Rule 403 is "a typical formulation of the prejudice rule and one after which
many state rules have been patterned." WIGMORE, supra note 90, at 679. In many
states, the rule regarding exclusion of relevant evidence on the ground of prejudice
is identical to Rule 403. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.403 (West 1987); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-12-3 (1987); IowA R. EvID. 403; MINN. R. EVID. 403; N.C.
R. EVID. 403; N.D. R. EVID. 403; TEx. R. EVID. 403; VT. R. EvID. 403. Many other
states have enacted a substantially similar rule. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West
1966) ("The Court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will ... create
substantial danger of undue prejudice .... "); NEV. REV. STAT. § 48.035 (1986)
(similar language); OHIO R. EVID. 403 (similar language); UTAH R. EVID. 403 (similar
language). In addition, many other states which have not legislated the prejudice rule
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excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice.1° 9 However, "unfair prejudice" in this
context has a limited meaning. The Advisory Committee's Note
defines unfair prejudice not in the sense of being damaging to the
party against whom it is offered, but as "suggest[ing] [a] decision on
an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional
one," such as "sympathy, hatred, contempt, retribution, or hor-
ror."1 1 0 Under this definition, unfair prejudice is strictly limited
to the effect of a given piece of evidence on the factfinder lu and
does not encompass larger concerns of fairness to the parties. The
probative value of a piece of evidence is not balanced against the
burden on the defendant of having to refute that evidence, nor
against any interest in protecting the defendant from multiple
prosecutions.
Therefore, the concern that motivated the lower court's holding
in Dowling and the reasoning in Wingate and its progeny-that
defendants should not be "forced to defend again against charges
have adopted similar language in caselaw. See e.g., Fridenn v. Evans, 622 P.2d 463,
467 (Ariz. 1980) ("[R]elevant evidence [may]. . . be excluded only when its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice .... ."); State v.
Alexander, 401 S.E.2d 146, 149 (S.C. 1991) ("We now -adopt the language, in
pertinent part, of Federal Rule of Evidence 403 that, 'although relevant, evidence may
be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice.'" (quoting FED. R. EVID. 403)); Independent Milk Producer's Co-op v.
Stoffel, 298 N.W.2d 102, 107 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980) ("The exclusion of [relevant]
evidence is within the trial court's discretion after balancing the probative value and
possible prejudice.").
The limitations of Rule 403 discussed above in the text accompanying this note
apply with equal force to these formulations of the prejudice rule.
'09 See FED. R. EVID. 403. For the text of Rule 403, see infra note 124. Other
rules, such as Rule 404(b), which provide for evidence to be excluded on the grounds
of prejudice, refer back to the standard articulated in Rule 403.
10 FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note.
1' See WIGMORE, supra note 90, at 684 (discussing how the prejudice rule is
designed to preventjury confusion). Wigmore discussed howjury misdecision might
occur:
The primary aim of the prejudice rule is to preventjury "misdecision." Jury
misdecision may occur in several ways:
1) the jury attributes greater evidential value to the evidence than is
warranted;
2) thejury does not misestimate the evidential value of the evidence, but the
facts established by the evidence (to the satisfaction of the jury) lead the jury to
apply substantive standards that are not in conformity with the substantive law;
and
3) the evidence, though relevant, confuses thejury. The prejudice rule is
designed to avert these dangers.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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or factual allegations which [they] overcame in an earlier tri-
al"112 -is entirely left out of the equation under the Federal Rules
of Evidence. Clearly, the Federal Rules do not contemplate, and are
patently inadequate to deal with, the possibility that other act
evidence will "force the defendant to spend time and money
relitigating matters considered at the first trial."1 3
In addition to this overarching problem with the scope of the
Federal Rules, individually, the rules offer acquitted defendants very
little protection from the unfair prejudice likely to result from the
admission of acquitted act evidence. As will be shown, none of the
three rules governing the admissibility of other act evidence-404(b),
403, and 105-accounts for the significance of a prior acquittal in
determining whether other act evidence should be admitted.
1. Rule 404(b)
The wording of Rule 404(b) suggests, and courts increasingly
have explicitly held, that it is a rule of inclusion, meaning that
evidence of an other act may be admitted for any purpose except to
prove the defendant's bad character. 114 Clever prosecutors can,
112 Wingate v. Wainwright, 464 F.2d 209, 214 (5th Cir. 1972); see also supra notes
45-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of Wingate and its progeny.
113 Dowling v. U.S., 439 U.S. 342, 352 (1990).
114 Rule 404(b) states that other act evidence may be admissible "for other
purposes, such as proof of motive [or] opportunity." FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (emphasis
added); see also United States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015, 1019 (3d Cir.) (explaining that
Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion and that evidence is admissible for any purpose
other than to show bad character, including purposes not listed in the rule), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 910 (1988); United States v. Blankenship, 775 F.2d 735, 739 (6th Cir.
1985) (similar analysis); United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127, 134 (4th Cir. 1973)
(similar analysis), ceit. denied, 415 U.S. 979 (1974).
All US.jurisdictions have a rule parallel to Rule 404(b), which excludes other act
evidence when offered to show bad character but allows it for various other purposes.
See LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 91, at 215-16. Many states have enacted a rule
identical to Rule 404(b). See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.404(2) (West 1979); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 626, R. 404(b) (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-404(2) (1989); ALASKA R.
EVID. 404(b); ARIZ. R. EVID. 404(b); ARK. R. EVID. 404(b); DEL. UNIF. R. EVID. 404(b);
ME. R. EVID. 404(b); TEX. R. EVID. 404(b); VT. R. EvM. 404(b). Many other states
have enacted substantially similar language, also inclusionary, under which other act
evidence may be admitted for any purpose except to show a propensity to commit
similar crimes. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101 (West 1966) ("Nothing in this
section prohibits the admission of evidence that a person committed a crime, civil
wrong, or other act when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident)
other than her disposition to commit such acts."); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-455 (1983)
(similar language); UTAH R. EVID. 404(b) (similar language). In addition, many other
states have a common law inclusionary rule. See, e.g., State v. Ibraimov, 446 A.2d 382,
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however, usually advance plausible reasons why the evidence serves
a purpose other than to show bad character. 115 Dowling itself is
a good example. In Dowling, the prosecution introduced the
evidence of attempted robbery to show identity. Other act evidence
is generally unhelpful on the question of identity, however, unless
the defendant's modus operandi is so unique that it is highly likely
that both crimes were committed by the same person. 116  In
Dowling, the only features linking the two crimes were the use of a
mask and gun-implements that are hardly unusual in robberies.
Moreover, Mrs. Henry's testimony revealed that the mask worn by
384 (Conn. 1982) ("Evidence ofother misconduct, although not ordinarily admissible
to prove the bad character or criminal tendencies of the accused, maybe allowed for
the purpose of proving many different things, such as intent, identity, malice, motive
or a system of criminal activity."); People v. Allweiss, 396 N.E.2d 735, 738 (N.Y. 1979)
("[E]vidence of other crimes may be admitted to show motive, intent, the absence of
mistake or accident, or a common scheme or plan or the identity of the guilty party.
The list, of course, is not exhaustive.") (citations omitted).
Although most jurisdictions have adopted an inclusionary version of the rule,
some jurisdictions continue to treat the rule as exclusionary, meaning that "evidence
is excluded except when offered for certain specific purposes. These purposes usually
include those purposes presented illustratively in Rule 404(b)." LEMPERT &
SALTZBURG, supra note 91, at 216. See, e.g., People v. Bayer, 513 N.E.2d 457,459 (111.
App. Ct.) ("It is well established that evidence of defendant's other crimes ... is
inadmissible to show his propensity to commit a crime .... There are, however, well-
recognized exceptions to this rule. Such evidence may be admitted to demonstrate
knowledge, intent, identity, motive, common design or scheme, or modus operandi.")
(citations omitted), appeal denied, 517 N.E.2d 1088 (Ill. 1987); Moore v. State, 533
A.2d 1, 5 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987) ("For the [other act] evidence even to qualify for
admission, it must fall within one of the exceptions that the court has recognized or
would be willing to recognize as having an independent relevance.... ."), cert, denied,
537 A.2d 273 (Md. 1988); Thomas v. State, 620 P.2d 1321, 1323 (Okla. Crim. App.
1980) ("The law in this State concerning evidence of crimes other than the one for
which the accused is being tried is that such evidence is inadmissible unless used to
show motive, intent, absence of mistake or accident, identity or a common scheme
or plan."). In jurisdictions where this stricter rule is in effect, prosecutors have
somewhat less flexibility in articulating permissible non-character purposes for other
act evidence, but Lempert and Saltzburg suggest that the difference is minimal in
practice: "[I]t matters little whether a jurisdiction adopts the inclusionary or
exclusionary version of the... rule. Those courts which exclude evidence of other
crimes except when offered for specific purposes exhibit great ingenuity in fitting
other crimes evidence into one of the permitted categories." LEMPERT & SALTZBURG,
supra note 91, at 216.
115 See Kuhns, supra note 90, at 799 ("[G]iven the elusive nature of the term
'character' and the fact that the list of permissible uses for specific acts evidence in
rule 404(b) is not exclusive, it should be relatively easy ... to articulate some
noncharacter purpose for which any particular specific act is relevant.") (footnotes
omitted).
116 See McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 83, § 190, at 559 (advocating
admission of other act evidence to identify handiwork unique to the accused).
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the intruder at her house was of a different color than the one used
in the bank robbery.11 7 Clearly, the main purpose for which this
evidence was introduced was not to illustrate a unique modus
operandi, but to suggest to the jury that the defendant, having
robbed before, was more likely than not to have committed the
bank robbery for which he was being tried-precisely the purpose
which the rule forbids. The fact that such a weak connection
between the modus operandi of the two crimes was nonetheless
sufficient for introduction of the evidence reveals the extent to
which the category of admissible other act evidence can be manipu-
lated by prosecutors to circumvent the prohibited bad character
evidence exception to admissibility.
In addition to the fact that Rule 404(b) favors admissibility, it
does not provide any protection against the unique prejudice likely
to result from the admission of acquitted act evidence. In an article
urging re-evaluation of Rule 404(b), Richard Kuhns noted that the
factors determining whether other act evidence is admissible or
inadmissible do not sufficiently incorporate the notion of preju-
dice. 1 The rule allows or forbids such evidence to be used
based on the use to which it will be put in trial (e.g., to show
identity or intent), rather than on the extent to which the particular
information will unfairly influence the jury against the defendant.
According to Kuhns, a rule of exclusion based on the concept of
"character evidence"-the notion that the probative value of past
117 See United States v. Dowling, 855 F.2d 114, 120 (3d Cir. 1988), affd, 493 U.S.
342 (1990).
118 Kuhns explained the operation of these factors as follows:
The primary determinants in applying the character prohibition appear
to be the probative value of the specific acts evidence and whether the rele-
vant propensity can, as a matter of common usage, readily be labeled as a
character trait. Prejudice, however, is not a function of either of these
factors. The degree of prejudice associated with any specific act evidence
is a function of how the factfinder is likely to respond to the badness of the
act. Consider, for example, two prosecutions for heroin possession. In one
case the defendant claims he did not know the substance was heroin. In the
other, the defendant claims that the heroin was in the sole possession of his
companion. To rebut the first defendant's claimed absence of knowledge,
the prosecutor offers to prove that the defendant had previously sold heroin
to school children. To establish the second defendant's possession the
prosecutor offers to prove that on two previous occasions the defendant had
possessed heroin. The latter evidence is more likely than the former to fall
within the character evidence prohibition, but in the eyes of the factfinder
the sale of heroin to school children is likely to be more prejudicial.
Kuhns, supra note 90, at 796 (footnote omitted).
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acts as an indicator of the defendant's behavior on a given occasion
is low-is too narrow because it fails to consider the unique
prejudice l1 ' that other act evidence engenders, regardless of its
status as "character" or "noncharacter" evidence. 120 It is this fear
of prejudice, after all, that underlies the traditional and modern
rules excluding other act evidence.121 Thus, the notion that
"extrinsic acts evidence is fraught with dangers of prejudice-ex-
traordinary dangers not presented by other types of evidence"
122
does not inform the operation of Rule 404(b) beyond the narrow
category of "character" evidence.
Recognition of this particular danger of prejudice is essential to
protect the previously acquitted defendant. The damage that other
act evidence may do to the defendant's credibility and to any
assumption by the jury that she is a law-abiding citizen is doubly
unfair if the other act never occurred. This is the "unfair prejudice"
which the Dowling Court referred to when it stated that the Federal
Rules of Evidence were sufficient to protect acquitted defen-
dants. 123 Rule 404(b), however, does not even address this dan-
ger.
119 Other act evidence is uniquely prejudicial because of its tendency to destroy
in the jury's mind the presumption of the defendant's innocence. Seesupra notes 89-
100 and accompanying text.
120 Kuhns, supra note 90, at 798. Professor Kuhns argues that the only "functional
purpose" served by the distinction articulated in Rule 404(b) is to "exclude evidence
of low probative value," as opposed to other rules of exclusion that serve some
extrinsic policy. Id. In his view, the unique prejudice associated with other act
evidence, rather than any notion of character, should animate the exclusionary rule.
Thus, he suggests a balancing rule similar to Rule 403 except with a presumption of
inadmissibility, which can be overcome only when the probative value of the evidence
is very strong. See id. This solution, although helpful to acquitted defendants, would
still be inadequate because it does not address the unfairness of having defendants
relitigate conduct for which they have been acquitted. See supra notes 112-13 and
accompanying text.
121 See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 83, §§ 185-87 (explaining that rules
that prohibit other act evidence are created because of a fear of prejudice).
" Kuhns, supra note 90, at 803 (quoting United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898,
912 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (Goldberg, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920
(1979)).
'5 See Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990) (suggesting it was
"acceptable" to deal with the "potential for abuse" ofacquitted act evidence "through
nonconstitutional sources like the Federal Rules of Evidence"); see alsosupra notes 15-
16 and accompanying text.
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2. Rule 403
Because of this loophole in the formulation of Rule 404(b),
"noncharacter" other act evidence (that is, any evidence for which
a prosecutor can plausibly advance a noncharacter justification) is
unfairly prejudicial only if it meets the test of Rule 403, the rule to
which all evidence is subject. Unfortunately, Rule 403 is also
inadequate to protect against the prejudice which the introduction
of acquitted act evidence engenders.
Before admitting evidence under Rule 404(b), a trial judge must
determine, under Rule 403, whether the probative value of the
evidence is substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair
prejudice. 124 Unfortunately for the defendant trying to bar the
admission of acquitted act evidence, Rule 403, like Rule 404(b), is
an inclusive rule that favors the admissibility of evidence.
125
Moreover, although this rule may protect defendants in some cases,
it does not operate in a principled and uniform manner to distin-
guish and exclude evidence that may be unfairly prejudicial to the
defendant. Because of the loose wording of the rule and the
necessity of evaluating the disputed evidence in the context of the
trial as a whole, trial judges virtually have complete discretion in
making Rule 403 determinations. Their decisions are essentially
unreviewable; appeals courts use an especially deferential abuse of
discretion standard because of their reluctance to re-evaluate the
subjective balancing test required by Rule 403.126 As a result,
trial judges' determinations are essentially subjective, unpredictable,
and arbitrary.
127
124 Rule 403 provides as follows: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EVID. 403.
12 Rule 403 provides that relevant evidence "may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." Id. (emphasis
added). This language strikes the balance strongly in favor of admission. See
WIGMORE, supra note 90, at 680. ("The term 'substantially' is meaningful because it
reminds the judge that he should place a high premium on probative evidence in
making his calculation of losses and profits."). The term "substantially" also appears
in most state law versions of the prejudice rule. See supra note 108.
126 For example, in United States v. Long, 574 F.2d 761 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 985 (1978), the court held that Rule 403 determinations were intended to be left
to the sole discretion of the trial judge and that such determinations would be left
undisturbed unless the judge acted irrationally. See id. at 767. The court commented,
"[i]fjudicial self-restraint is ever desirable, it is when a Rule 403 analysis of a trial
court is reviewed by an appellate tribunal." Id.127 As the Long court points out:
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This imprecise, open-ended formulation of Rule 403 provides
dubious protection from the specific evils of other act evidence in
general. 128 It is especially inadequate when the prior act was the
subject of an acquittal. In such a case, the trial judge's analysis of
the probative value of the other act evidence does not require any
consideration of the fact that the occurrence of the prior act may be
in doubt. Probative value should be determined by considering the
relevance of the evidence, 129 the need for the evidence in light of
evidence already presented, and, as the advisory committee note to
the rule suggests, the probable effectiveness of a limiting instruc-
tion.13 0 As Professor Patterson points out, Rule 403 "is designed
to deal with the strength of the inference from the other crime to
the ultimate issue it is offered to prove, and thus assumes that the
other crime has been proved; hence, the sufficiency of the proof of
the other crime is an entirely different question." 1' 3  Under Rule
403, the judge need not consider how likely it is that the other act
occurred in making a determination of its probative worth.1
32
[I]t is manifest that the draftsmen [of the Federal Rules] intended that the
trial judge be given a very substantial discretion in "balancing" probative
value on the one hand and "unfair prejudice" on the other .... This
inference is strengthened by the fact that the Rule does not establish a mere
imbalance as the standard, but rather requires that evidence "may" be
barred only if its probative value is "substantially outweighed" by prejudice.
Long, 574 F.2d at 767.
28 See supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text.
'" Relevance is defined in Rule 401 as follows: "'Relevant evidence' means
evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence
to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence." FED. R. EVID. 401.
130 See FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note ("In reaching a decision
whether to exclude on grounds of unfair prejudice, consideration should be given to
the probable effectiveness of a limiting instruction.").
31 Patterson, supra note 99, at 356 (quoting EDMUND M. MORGAN, BASIC
PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 45-49 (1961)).
132 In spite of the fact that Rule 403 does not require any consideration of the
sufficiency of proof of other acts in weighing their probative value, some courts have
taken it upon themselves to factor in this variable when deciding to admit other act
evidence under Rule 404(b). See e.g., United States v. Shavers, 615 F.2d 266,271 (5th
Cir. 1980) (explaining that doubt as to whether the extrinsic offense was committed
reduces its probative value); United States v. Herrera-Medina, 609 F.2d 376,380 (9th
Cir. 1979) (similar analysis); United States v. Dolliole. 597 F.2d 102, 106 (7th Cir.
1979) (similar analysis). Nonetheless, any decision to consider the sufficiency of proof
is entirely within the discretion of thejudge. No precedent has been established that
affirmatively directs the lower courts to consider it in their Rule 403 determinations
under Rules 404(b) and 403.
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Furthermore, even if ajudge wanted to consider the sufficiency
of proof of the other act in deciding whether to admit it under Rule
403, the Supreme Court's decision in Huddleston v. United States1 3
limits her ability to do so. In that case, the Court held that other
act evidence may be admitted if a reasonable jury could conclude
that the act occurred. When considering the admissibility of other
act evidence under Rule 403, a judge may not, after Huddeston,
exclude other act evidence which meets this standard of proof on
the ground that its probative value, not otherwise outweighed by
unfair prejudice, is so outweighed because the act was insufficiently
proved. Such reasoning would directly violate Huddleston's
holding.1M The lenient standards for admission under both Rules
403 and 404(b), combined with the lack of any required consider-
ation of sufficiency of proof in Rule 403 determinations of proba-
tive value, provide defendants little or no protection from the unfair
prejudice that can result from the admission of acquitted act
evidence.
3. Rule 105
The advisory committee note to Rule 403 provides that where
other act evidence is admitted for a proper purpose, the judge
should give a limiting instruction pursuant to Rule 105,135 in-
structing jurors to consider the evidence only for the limited
purpose for which it was offered. 136 Whatever the effectiveness
of such instructions in other contexts, courts and commentators
have recognized that it is difficult, if not impossible, for juries to
ignore the prejudicial implications of other act evidence.13 7 Juries
133 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
134 A scheme incorporating sufficiency of proof into the balancing test under
Rules 404(b) and 403 has been proposed by Professor Calvin Sharpe. See Sharpe,
supra note 91, at 565-66. Professor Sharpe suggested that Rules 404(b) and 403
incorporate a "sliding scale of proof," where the level of proof required before the
other act evidence can be admitted increases according to the amount of unfair
prejudice at risk. See id. at 585. This scheme, however, was clearly invalidated by
Huddleston.
135 Rule 105 provides as follows: "When evidence which is admissible as to one
party or for one purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another
purpose is admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper
scope and instruct the jury accordingly." FED. R. EVID. 105.
'3 See supra note 130.
137 See Kuhns, supra note 90, at 794-96 (arguing that the distinction between
evidence to show "propensity" (prohibited character evidence) and evidence for other
purposes is slippery and ineffective for restricting the jury's access to prejudicial
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respond irrationally to such evidence and reach unjustified
conclusions about the defendant's guilt-which is why it has
traditionally been considered a highly prejudicial and dangerous
type of evidence in the first place.1s8 It is unlikely that simply
because such evidence is introduced for some other limited
purpose, juries will respond to it with any more reason and
judgment than they otherwise would, or that they will ignore its
obvious character implications. Courts have long recognized the
futility of instructing jurors not to consider these implications,
referring to the use of limiting instructions with other act evidence
as "mental gymnastics"13 9 requiring "human beings to act with a
measure of dispassion and exactitude well beyond mortal capaci-
ties."140  One past Supreme Court Justice has even called the
suggestion that juries follow such instructions an "unmitigated
fiction.
" 141
Because other act evidence is freely admitted for a variety of
purposes, because exclusion of other act evidence on the ground of
undue prejudice is a limited and arbitrary protection, and because
limiting instructions do little to counter the prejudice arising from
other act evidence, it is clear that the Federal Rules of Evidence are
an inadequate device for protecting defendants from the burden of
having to relitigate acquitted conduct. An alternative form of
protection is clearly needed.
information); Comment, supra note 93, at 777 (arguing that jury instructions are
almost always fruitless and discussing jury examinations showing an inability and
reluctance byjurors to follow the court's instruction regarding the use of defendant's
prior criminal record as evidence).
13
8 See supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text.
139 Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 556
(1932).
140 United States v. Daniels, 770 F.2d 1111, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see also United
States v. Carter, 482 F.2d 738, 740 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("Even when the prior criminal
record is brought into the evidence in an appropriate manner, there is the well-nigh
inescapable prejudice on the issue of guilt notwithstanding the trial court carefully
instructs thejury as to the limited consideration it may accord the evidence."); United
States v. Bailey, 426 F.2d 1236, 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ("The ultimate question is
whether in the search for truth the value of the evidence for the limited purpose for
which it is admissible is outweighed by these various factors, the most important of
which ... is the prejudice resulting from the jury's inability to limit its influence
141 Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson,J., concurring).
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IV. FORMULATING A MORE EFFECTIVE PROTECTION FOR ACQUTED
DEFENDANTS
A. The Difficulties Inherent in Interpreting the General Verdict
Essentially, the major obstacle to a clear determination of the
preclusive effect of an acquittal under strict rules of collateral
estoppel is the criminal verdict itself. The factual findings on which
an acquittal is based are often unclear, yet for an acquittal to have
any preclusive effect it is necessary for a court to equate an acquittal
with an affirmative finding of innocence by a preponderance of the
evidence. 142 This is the equation the Dowling Court rejected
when it stated that an acquittal does not prove innocence but rather
merely proves the existence of a reasonable doubt as to guilt.'
43
Although there are strong arguments for the proposition that an
acquittal should categorically function as a determination of
innocence, 14 and the rights of criminal defendants under the
Double Jeopardy Clause would certainly be protected if this were
the rule, there are a number of problems with this approach. Most
importantly, as the Dowling Court points out, treating an acquittal
as a determination of innocence may not always be realistic.
145
The burden of proof required for conviction is heavy. No matter
how far the balance of evidence tips in favor of the government,
juries are compelled to acquit if any reasonable doubt is left unre-
solved. Common sense suggests that many acquittals would not
142 The "identity of the issue" requirement of collateral estoppel dictates that the
issue must have been decided under the same standard of proof in the first action as
is required for its admission in the second action. Seesupra note 8. After Huddleston
v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988), the standard of proof for a finding that an
other act occurred is preponderance of the evidence. See supra note 48 and text
accompanying note 73.
143 See Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 349 (1990) ("'[The acquittal did]
not prove that the defendant is innocent; it merely proves the existence of a
reasonable doubt as to his guilt.'" (quoting United States v. One Assortment of 89
Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 361-62 (1984))).
144 See, e.g., Dowling, 493 U.S. at 361 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that
introducing evidence of other bad acts fatally undermines the presumption of
innocence in the second trial, a result that is particularly unfair in the case of an
acquittal since that presumption was never defeated in the first trial); Craig L.
Crawford, Comment, Dowling v. United States: A Failure of the CriminalJustice System,
52 OHIO ST. L.J. 991, 1006-09 (1991) (arguing that the presumption of innocence in
our justice system means that if a defendant is acquitted, she should thereafter be
considered innocent of those charges).
145 See supra note 143.
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stand if they had to be justified under a preponderance of the
evidence standard.
Furthermore, the general verdict, used in almost every criminal
case, 146 gives criminal juries an implicit privilege to acquit, in
spite of overwhelming evidence, out of compassion or disagreement
with the law.147 Given these facts, it is clear that an acquittal can
represent many things other than a jury's positive determination
that a defendant is innocent of the charges alleged. To treat the
two as equivalent ignores the "identity of the issues" requirement of
collateral estoppel, 4 ' thereby frustrating the interest of the judi-
cial system in truth determination, 149 which is one of its central
and most important goals.
150
Similarly, a general verdict of acquittal cannot be said to resolve
all ultimate issues in a defendant's favor, as required by collateral
estoppel. Defendants often assert general or alternative defenses,
and the bases for acquittals are usually mysterious.151 To allow
defendants to foreclose any issue that might have been determined
by a general verdict would again stretch the collateral estoppel
doctrine beyond its role in a truth seeking system.
Although many courts have held and commentators have argued
that the rights of criminal defendants under the Double Jeopardy
Clause are more important than strict adherence to the principles
underlying the collateral estoppel doctrine,1 5 2 it is clear, in light
of the Dowling decision, that the Supreme Court takes these
146 See supra note 30.
147 See United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 182 (1st Cir. 1969) (noting that the
jury, as conscience of the community, may acquit for reasons of generosity, mercy,
sympathy, or because they think the law is wrong). For analysis of the ways in which
juries tend to nullify the law, see generally Chaya Weinberg-Brodt,Juty Nullification
andJuy-Control Procedures, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 825 (1990) (explaining that juries have
the power to nullify the law for equitable or arbitrary reasons).
148 See supra note 8.
149 See supra text accompanying notes 37-39.
's' See United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626 (1980) ("There is no gainsaying
that arriving at the truth is a fundamental goal of our legal system.").
'"' See Skidmore v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 167 F.2d 54, 61 (2d Cir. 1948) (asserting
that the general verdict obscures the facts, the law, and the application of the law to
the facts, thereby "confer[ring] on the jury a vast power to commit error and do
mischief by... aggregating instead of segregating the issues").152 See supra text accompanying notes 45-57,86; see also Crawford, supra note 144,
at 1009 ("The approach taken by the Supreme Court in Dowling is simply repugnant
to the concepts of due process and double jeopardy.'); Delao, supra note 46, at 1050
("The introduction of prior acquittals results in retrying the defendant for the earlier
crime .... However, our judicial system treats an acquittal as a verdict of inno-
cence." (citations omitted)).
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collateral estoppel concerns seriously and will safeguard them even
at the expense of other important interests. Thus, any attempt to
protect defendants from multiple prosecutions in the context of
other crimes evidence must stay within the established boundaries
of the collateral estoppel doctrine.
B. A Solution-Special Interrogatories at Acquitted
Defendants' Request
One way to satisfy both defendants' double jeopardy interests
and the state's concern for truth determination is to offer defen-
dants the option of requesting supplemental special interroga-
tories153 with an acquittal. These interrogatories would establish
the jury's findings on all issues which the jury was required to
consider in reaching its verdict, and the answers would be given
preclusive effect in all subsequent litigation between the defendant
and the prosecuting entity.1M Special interrogatories have not
been used in this manner before. As this Comment will argue,
however, there is no reason, either of procedure or policy, why
defendants should not be allowed to request such interrogatories,
or why judges should not approve them. While special interroga-
tories are now rarely used in criminal cases,1 55 few jurisdictions
categorically forbid their use, 156 and there is some favorable
153 "Special interrogatories" are generally defined as questions put to the jury
regarding issues essential to the verdict. The answers to the questions are returned
together with a general verdict. See supra note 30. "Supplemental special interrogato-
ries," as used in this Comment, are questions which are propounded only after the
jury reaches a verdict, and which thus do not affect the outcome of the jury's
deliberations on guilt and cannot be used to challenge the general verdict. See infra
notes 159, 178-86 and accompanying text. In particular, supplemental special
interrogatories are distinguished from the model of special interrogatories articulated
in FED. R. Civ. P. 49(b), which directs the court to submit the questions at the same
time that it sends the jury out to deliberate on the general verdict, and provides that
the answers to the questions can be used to challenge or reverse the general verdict.
154 To use the Dowling case as an example, a negative answer to an interrogatory
regarding whether, under a preponderance standard, the jury would find that
defendant was present in Mrs. Henry's home would have prevented the government
from ever presenting evidence of defendant's presence in Mrs. Henry's home in any
subsequent lawsuit, civil or criminal. Similarly, a negative answer to an interrogatory
regarding defendant's intent to commit robbery in Mrs. Henry's home would
preclude the government from ever characterizing this event as an attempted robbery.
If the jury was unable to make any findings by a preponderance of the evidence, it
could have indicated which issue was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt,
precluding any related litigation requiring proof of that issue for conviction.
155 See supra note 30.
156 Although the issue raises some due process questions, see infra note 167, courts
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precedent for the use of supplemental157 special interrogatories
in other criminal contexts.
158
To address most effectively the concerns raised by the Dowling
doctrine, interrogatories with an acquittal should be supplemental
to the verdict, that is, the interrogatories should be answered only
after the jury reaches a general verdict of acquittal, for the sole
purpose of determining the preclusive effect of that acquittal.
Because they would not be essential to the validity of the general
verdict, and would not influence the jury's deliberations on the
general verdict, such interrogatories could be answered under the
preponderance of the evidence standard. 159 Any issues of fact
have repeatedly held that, while the use of special interrogatories in criminal cases is
frowned on, it is not prohibited. See, e.g., Heald v. Mullaney, 505 F.2d 1241, 1245 (1st
Cir. 1974) ("[W]e do not believe that a mechanical... rule of unconstitutionality is
warranted for all special questions in criminal cases."), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 955
(1975); United States v. Ogull, 149 F. Supp. 272, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (stating that
"departures from the unqualified general verdict" are sometimes acceptable); People
v. Sequoia Books, Inc., 513 N.E.2d 468, 474 (II. 1987) (acknowledging that special
interrogatories have been permitted for limited purposes), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 868
(1988); Commonwealth v. Licciardi, 443 N.E.2d 386, 390 (Mass. 1982) ("There are
instances in which special questions in a criminal case will aid in the disposition of a
case."); State v. Simon, 398 A.2d 861, 866 (N.J. 1979) (noting that the prejudicial
effect of special interrogatories might by mitigated if the questions are integrated with
ajury's final deliberations); see also Brown, supra note 37, at 831 ("[I]t is clear that
[there is no] basis, constitutional or otherwise, for generally denying a defendant the
right to submit special interrogatories in a criminal case.").
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not specifically provide for the use
of special interrogatories, but Rule 57(b) provides that a court may, at its discretion,
allow procedures not provided for in the rules so long as they are "not inconsistent
with [the] rules or with any applicable statute." FED. R. CRIM. P. 57(b). Some state
codes actually do provide for the use of special interrogatories in certain circum-
stances. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1150 (West 1985) (alowingjuries to find special
verdicts when legal issues are unclear); MASS. R. CRIM. P. 27(c) ("The trial judge may
submit special questions to the jury.").
157 See supra note 153.
15 ' See infra notes 177-80 and accompanying text.
159 It is important to note that there is no specific precedent, either in civil or
criminal procedure, for allowing special interrogatories to be answered under a
different standard of proof than the one required for the verdict itself. This issue
would be unlikely to ever arise in a civil suit, where the preponderance of the
evidence standard is generally in effect for all issues, including the ultimate verdict.
However, there is no reason why this innovation should not be allowed. Since the
interrogatories would be supplemental to the verdict and would not be used to
challenge it, no adverse consequences would arise from allowing the jury to articulate
its findings more specifically than the criminal verdict requires. If thejury could not
answer the interrogatories or if it gave answers inconsistent with the verdict, the
acquittal would simply have no preclusive effect. See infra text accompanying notes
187-90.
ACQUITTALS IN JEOPARDY
determined in the defendant's favor under that standard would be
given preclusive effect in subsequent prosecutions or civil suits.
The scheme proposed here offers several advantages. First, it
allows defendants to avoid-unfair and prejudicial multiple prosecu-
tions by permitting one jury to resolve trial issues in a way that
maximizes their preclusive effect. Relitigation of issues raised in the
earlier trial could not be justified based on any uncertainty about
the jury's factual findings or the standard of proof under which such
findings were made. Any acquittal which in fact represents ajury's
affirmative belief in the defendant's innocence would be recorded
as such for the defendant's benefit. Second, interrogatories serve
defendants' interests without altering the collateral estoppel
doctrine as it now operates in a civil context. The use of special
interrogatories is now common and accepted in civil practice,
16°
and the collateral estoppel benefits of special interrogatories in civil
suits are well recognized.1 61  Finally, interrogatories conserve
judicial, prosecutorial, and defense resources by preventing
relitigation of issues that have already been decided by a jury.
62
Special interrogatories answered in the defendant's favor would not
only preclude the introduction of other act evidence in subsequent
criminal trials, but would also prevent any civil suits based on the
same facts as the criminal prosecution.
In analyzing the feasibility of this proposal, it is important to
examine the use of special interrogatories in criminal trials
generally. Although special interrogatories are not common in
criminal cases, they have occasionally been used. Increasingly,
courts are using special interrogatories in RICO cases to compel the
jury to specify the predicate acts upon which a RICO conviction is
based.163  Furthermore, supplemental special interrogatories are
'6e, ee e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 49(b) ("The court may submit to thejury, together with
appropriate forms for a general verdict, written interrogatories upon one or more
issues of fact ... ."). Answers to special interrogatories clearly determine for
collateral estoppel purposes which issues were essential to the jury's verdict.
161 See, e.g., Mark S. Brodin, Accuracy, Efficiency, and Accountability in the Litigation
Process-the Casefor the Fact Verdict, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 15, 71 (1990) ("The disclosure
of fact determinations achieved by the special verdict is also extremely helpful in the
application ofcollateral estoppel (issue preclusion)... [s]ince it mustbe demonstrat-
ed that the issue in question had been resolved in a particular way in the previous
case... .).
162 The societal concern for conservingjudicial resources, which is one animating
factor of the civil collateral estoppel doctrine, is arguably even more significant in a
criminal context because taxpayers not only pay for the time and efforts of the judge
and the court, but also of the prosecutors and many of the defense attorneys.
163 See Robert M. Grass, Note, BifurcatedJuty Deliberations in Criminal RICO Trials,
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often used to determine issues for sentencing, 164 and to clarify
issues for appeal. 165 Still, the use of special interrogatories in the
criminal context is by no means universally accepted. 166 It is
therefore important to address the well-entrenched objections to
using interrogatories in criminal trials. The most important of these
objections is based on the concern that compelling juries to answer
interrogatories will unduly influence their deliberations on the issue
of guilt. Additionally, there are significant concerns about how such
interrogatories would be administered in the criminal context.
1. Avoiding Undue Influence on the Jury
Historically, the use of special verdicts and special interroga-
tories in criminal cases has been frowned on as an unwarranted
judicial intrusion into the jury's function. Requiring specific
findings for criminal verdicts is seen as encroaching on a defen-
dant's right to unfettered juries that may acquit for any reason.
167
One "historic function" ofjuries, particularly in criminal cases, is to
"temper[] rules of law by common sense brought to bear upon the
facts of a specific case." 168 The use of special interrogatories
restricts this function by compelling jurors to justify their findings
and by making it more difficult to depart from strict rules of
57 FORDHAM L. REv. 745, 752 (1989) (citing cases in which special interrogatories
have supplemented general verdicts in RICO convictions).
164 See infra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
165 See Commonwealth v. Licciardi, 443 N.E.2d 386, 390-91 (Mass. 1982)
(approving the use of special interrogatories to determine whether thejury's guilty
verdict on a charge of first degree murder was based on a finding of premeditation
or felony-murder, and if finding was based on felony-murder, to determine which
felony was involved in order to clarify the issue for appeal).166 See supra note 30.
167 See United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 180-83 (1st Cir. 1969). In this classic
and much-quoted opinion, the court analyzes the long history of the general verdict
in criminal cases and the reasons for preserving it, arguing that special verdicts
represent impermissible judicial pressure on the jury's right to acquit despite evidence
of guilt and to nullify the law. Both are liberties that are protected by the Due
Process Clause and the right to trial by jury; see also United States v. Desmond, 670
F.2d 414,420 (3d Cir. 1982) (Aldisert,J., dissenting) (arguing that special verdicts and
special interrogatories in criminal cases attack the fundamental character of the
criminal jury and should be prohibited in almost all cases); State v. Beavers, 364 So.
2d 1004, 1009 (La. 1978) ("[T]here is grave danger that special verdicts in criminal
cases would prevent the jury from performing its most important... function, of
providing the defendant with a safeguard against arbitrary, unchecked governmental
power through community participation in the determination of guilt or innocence."
(citations omitted)).
168 United States v. Ogull, 149 F. Supp. 272, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
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law. 169 Furthermore, it prevents the jury from reaching a consen-
sus on the result even if they disagree on the factual basis for it,
which decreases the possibility of compromise verdicts and increases
the possibility of hung juries.
170
These concerns can be addressed without sacrificing the use of
special interrogatories, however. First, and most important, it is
clear that the courts that have rejected special interrogatories have
done so to protect the interests of defendants. 17 1 In situations
where interrogatories are not forced on defendants, or where
increased risk of conviction is not an issue, courts have been much
more receptive to their use. For example, in United States v.
O'Looney,172 the Ninth Circuit upheld a trial judge's use of a
special verdict, designed to clarify issues for a confused jury because
the defendant did not object and the wording was not suggestive of
guilt.1 73  In State v. Propps,174 the Supreme Court of Iowa
allowed the use of special interrogatories to clarify the jury's factual
169 As the First Circuit asserted:
There is no easier way to reach, and perhaps force, a verdict of guilty than
to approach it step by step .... By a progression of questions each of which
seems to require an answer unfavorable to the defendant, a reluctant juror
may be led to vote for a conviction which ... he would have resisted.
Spock, 416 F.2d at 182. Similarly, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated:
The singular vice of special interrogatories, particularly in a criminal
trial, is their potential for destroying the ability of the jury to deliberate
upon the issue of guilt or innocence free of extraneous influences. This
potential for harm inheres in the subtly coercive effect interrogatories can
have upon the course of a jury's deliberations.
State v. Simon, 398 A.2d 861, 865 (N.J. 1979).170 See Samuel M. Driver, The Special Verdict-Theory and Practice, 26 WASH. L. REV.
21, 24 (1951) ("Jury verdicts often represent compromises, and it is not so easy to
reach separate compromise agreements on several factfindings of a special verdict as
it is to agree on one all-inclusive general verdict.").
171 See United States v. Desmond, 670 F.2d 414, 417-18 (3d Cir. 1982) (arguing
that "lack ofjudicial enthusiasm" for special interrogatories in criminal trials is based
on the "the feeling that denial of a general verdict might deprive the defendant of the
right to ajury's finding based more on external circumstances than the strict letter
of the law" (citations omitted)).
172 544 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1023 (1976).
173 Seealso People v. Sequoia Books, Inc., 513 N.E.2d 468,475 (111.1987) (allowing
the use of special interrogatories because "rather than harm[ing] the defendant, the
use of special interrogatories ... actually benefitted the defendant"); State v.
Fournier, 554 A.2d 1184, 1188 (Me. 1989) (finding no reversible error in the use of
special interrogatories because the defendant did not object at trial and because the
"verdict form did not 'lead the jurors down the guilty trail'" (quoting State v. Heald,
307 A.2d 188, 193 (Me. 1973))).
174 190 N.W.2d 408 (Iowa 1971).
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findings because the defendant requested them. In United States v.
Coonan,175 the Second Circuit upheld a trial judge's use of special
interrogatories requiring a factual finding that each RICO defen-
dant had participated in at least two predicate acts. The court
approved these special interrogatories because their purpose was to
benefit defendants by preventing "prejudicial spillover" that might
result in the convictions of marginally involved defendants. 176 If
proposed interrogatories are intended to benefit defendants rather
than the government, and particularly if they can only be used at
the request of defendants, most objections to their use disap-
pear. 177
The question of whether special interrogatories influence the
jury's deliberations of the defendant's guilt can be addressed by
allowing the jury to answer the interrogatories only after it has
reached a decision to acquit. Courts are more likely to approve
requests for special interrogatories in criminal cases where they are
supplemental to the verdict, that is, where they do not directly
affect the outcome of deliberations. For example, in United States
v. Stassi,178 the Second Circuit held that special interrogatories
were permissible when they related to sentencing rather than to
guilt. In Newman v. United States,179 the Tenth Circuit actually
vacated a conviction based on a general verdict and remanded the
case, requiring special interrogatories to assure that individual
conspiracy defendants were not sentenced too harshly.
18 0
Similarly, special interrogatories could become more palatable
in general by isolating the jury's deliberation process from its
consideration of the special interrogatories. This could be effected
by giving the questionnaire to the jury in a sealed envelope that
would be returned unopened in the event of a conviction. A similar
approach has been approved by several courts dealing with
sentencing issues. For example, in United States v. Gernie,181 the
175 839 F.2d 886 (2d Cir. 1988).
176 Id. at 890.
177 See United States v. Desmond, 670 F.2d 414, 420 (3d Cir. 1982) (Aldisert,J.,
dissenting) (denouncing special verdicts and special interrogatories in criminal cases,
but providing an exception in cases where they are "specifically requested by the
defendant for cause shown").
178 544 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 907 (1977).
179 817 F.2d 635 (10th Cir. 1987).
180 The interrogatories directed the jury to determine which type of drugs the
defendant had conspired to distribute because non-narcotic drug distribution carried
a lighter sentence. See id. at 637.
18 252 F.2d 664 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 968 (1958).
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Second Circuit approved the use of a special interrogatory regard-
ing defendant's membership in a conspiracy after a crucial date,
which affected his sentence, only after the jury reached a general
verdict of guilty. Similarly, the Supreme Court of Washington in
State v. Slaughterl82 allowed the use of a special interrogatory
regarding whether or not the defendant was armed only after a
guilty verdict was reached. The First Circuit in United States v.
SpoCk 183 actually suggested this approach to cure the defect it
perceived in submitting special interrogatories to the jury during its
deliberation of the defendant's guilt:
If the procedure was, as we hold, prejudicial to the rights of
the defendants, it is not saved by the propriety of the court's
motive, doubtless a strong one in this particular case where
difficult legal issues were involved, of avoiding an appellate court's
dilemma due to ignorance of what theory the jury based its verdict
upon. Assuming this to be proper, as to which we express no final
opinion, it could have been accomplished by sending the jury out
to answer special questions after it had returned its general
verdict.
8 4
For the same reason, a Second Circuit justice suggested that
special interrogatories in a RICO trial should be submitted to
establish predicate acts, but only after the jury returned a convic-
tion.18 5 This would also free defendants from having to weigh the
potential effects of any questions, no matter how sympathetically
worded, on the deliberation process against the collateral estoppel
benefits to be obtained from the interrogatories.
186
182 425 P.2d 876 (Wash. 1967).
18 416 F.2d 165, 180-83 (1st Cir. 1969).
184 Id. at 183 n.42 (citations omitted). This suggestion responds to a "dilemma"
similar to that posed by any attempt to apply collateral estoppel to a criminal verdict.
'85 See United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913, 925-28 (2d Cir.) (Newman, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part), cet. denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984).
186 Interestingly, one commentator has proposed that defendants be allowed to
submit special interrogatories after the jury returns a verdict of guilty, both for
double jeopardy purposes and to enable the defendant to challenge any conviction
not dearly based on the appropriate factual findings:
It does not follow [from Spock] that the jury should also be empowered
to convict against the weight of the evidence.... [S]pecial verdicts might
often prevent a jury from convicting on the basis of passion or prejudice.
... If a guilty verdict were returned, the defendant would have the option
of submitting special verdicts. A failure by the jury to agree on factual
findings consistent with the guilty verdict would result in a new trial, or...
an acquittal.
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2. Resolving Administrative Issues
The wider use of special interrogatories in criminal trials would
add some administrative burden to the criminal justice system.
Typical complaints about special interrogatories are that they
increase jury deliberation time, 187 yield ambiguous or inconsistent
answers, and lead to disputes or additional litigation over the
wording of the interrogatories.18 8 To be effective and practical,
special interrogatories for collateral estoppel purposes must be as
simple as possible to administer.
The issues in a criminal case are rarely complex. Effective
interrogatories would therefore be limited to the essential elements
of the crime and would require only yes or no answers. This would
reduce any jury confusion or tendency to return ambiguous
answers. Defendant's counsel would propose the interrogatories
subject to approval by the court. Disputes between the prosecutor
and defense counsel would be unlikely since by definition the
interrogatories could not affect the jury's deliberations on the
verdict.
Because any findings generated pursuant to the interrogatories
would be made under a preponderance of the evidence standard
rather than under the heavier reasonable doubt measure required
for criminal conviction, any apparent inconsistencies between the
verdict and the interrogatories would not be problematic. If none
of the questions are resolved in defendant's favor, future courts may
conclude that, although the jury found reasonable doubt as to
defendant's guilt, it could not determine any element of the offense
in defendant's favor by a preponderance of the evidence. The
acquittal would, therefore, have no preclusive effect.
Finally, the amount of time jurors spend answering the interrog-
atories need not be excessive. Ifjurors cannot agree on a particular
question, they can simply refuse to answer it. There is some
precedent for this, even where the special interrogatories are
intended to accompany the verdict. In Brennan v. United States,189
the jury refused to answer the special interrogatories, and instead
Brown, supra note 37, at 829-30 (footnotes omitted).
187 See Driver, supra note 170, at 24 ("Juries seem to have more trouble reaching
an agreement on special verdicts. Most of them were obliged to deliberate for twelve
hours or longer.").
188 See Brodin,supra note 161, at 73-83 (discussing cases in which the interrogato-
ries were either confusing or misleading, or the jury answers were contradictory).
189 867 F.2d 111 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1022 (1989).
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submitted a general verdict that was affirmed. Alternatively, the
trial court could decide that the answers need not be unanimous,
particularly if the district permits non-unanimous verdicts in civil
matters.
Streamlined in this manner, special interrogatories for acquittals
could be routinely used in criminal trials.19° Such routine use
would do much to protect the interests of defendants by preserving
the finality of their acquittals and to prevent needless and expensive
relitigation of previously determined issues.
CONCLUSION
In Dowling v. United States, the Court chose to apply strictly
collateral estoppel doctrine and to protect the judicial interest in
truth determination at the expense of defendants' double jeopardy
rights by holding that acquittals should not be permitted to
preclude all future relitigation of the facts and issues raised in the
first trial. Unfortunately, the natural result of the Dowling decision
is that defendants have little protection from the unfair burden of
relitigating conduct for which they have already been acquitted.
This Comment has proposed that the interests of criminal defen-
dants can be better reconciled with the Dowling decision by allowing
them to request supplemental interrogatories with acquittals.
Supplemental interrogatories would make criminal collateral
estoppel work more efficiently by protecting determinations of
innocence and by preventing multiple litigation, thereby conserving
judicial resources and alleviating double jeopardy concerns without
interfering with the state's interest in truth determination or
allowing defendants the ongoing benefit of erroneous acquittals.
190 Defendants could be expected to ask for the interrogatories routinely even if
they have no expectation of ever being prosecuted again because the interrogatories
only exist to serve their interests and impose no costs on them. Because the
prosecution cannot object, there is little to prevent interrogatories from becoming
standard practice ifjudges allow their use.
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